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When
the economy was booming the euro was seen as a source of strength or
those countries that had adopted the new currency. Now it is
transforming into its opposite, as the crisis in Greece demonstrates.
The Marxists warned about this long ago.
“Last
year it was banks; this year it is countries. The economic crisis,
which seemed to have eased off in the latter part of 2009, is once
again in full swing as the threat of sovereign default looms.”
The
opening words of the lead article in last week’s issue of The
Economist
adequately convey the growing mood of pessimism of the bourgeoisie.
Only yesterday they were all talking of “green shoots” and the
“end of the recession. Now Europe’s leaders are struggling to
avert what The
Economist
describes as “the biggest financial disaster in the euro’s
11-year history”. Suddenly the eyes of the world are focused on
Greece, which is faced with the possibility defaulting. It will not
be the first such case in Europe. Iceland was forced into bankruptcy
by the world financial crisis. This led to demonstrations on the
streets and the fall of a government.
Iceland
is a very small country on the fringes of Europe. But Greece is a
member of the EU and part of the euro-zone. If it defaults, it will
be the first EU member to do so. This is a serious cause for alarm
among EU leaders. The introduction of a common currency means that
they are tied together in an inflexible system. What was at first
seen as a source of strength is now seen as a dangerous source of
weakness. The crisis of Greek capitalism can cause a crisis of the
euro and drag the rest of Europe down with it.
The
Marxists predicted this
Over
a decade ago, at a time when everyone was singing the praises of the
euro and confidently predicting an irresistible movement in the
direction of European unification, we wrote a document called “A
Socialist Alternative to the European Union",
in which we presented the opposite view:
“The
problem is that the European capitalists are attempting to move
towards union at a time when the general economic conditions are
pointing in the opposite direction. If they could obtain a rate of
growth of 5 or 6 percent, as they did during the period of upswing,
then they could bring about monetary union without too much trouble.
But with growth rates of 3 - 2 percent or less, this is impossible.
“(…)
All this means that a Federal European state on a capitalist basis is
ruled out. Especially in conditions of world economic crisis, which
is inevitable in the next two years or so, all the contradictions
will come to the fore. It is unlikely that the EU will break up
completely because of the need to defend their markets against the
USA and Japan. They have to hang together or hang separately. But the
movement towards European union will founder in a sea of national
conflicts and bickering.”
(A Socialist Alternative to the European Union,
Alan
Woods, 4 June 1997)
The
failure of the attempt to introduce a European Constitution confirmed
this perspective. And what did we write about the euro?
“There
is a vast gulf separating theory and practice. In theory, it all
looks very nice and logical. The problem is that the capitalist
system is anything but logical. In the abstract, the idea of a common
European currency is a good one. It would save a lot of money,
streamline trade, facilitate long-term economic planning and
investment decisions and eliminate a whole series of unnecessary and
wasteful operations. But in practice, on a capitalist basis, it would
be a disaster. In theory it would mean that all the national
currencies would be locked into a rigid system. No national
government would be allowed to alter the agreed exchange rate. This
means that no country would be allowed to get out of a crisis by
resorting to devaluation.
“(…)
Denied access to devaluation, each government would have to seek a
solution at home—which means a policy of savage deflation and
unemployment, especially for the weaker economies. It also means an
enormous increase in tensions between the different states and
between the classes within each state. Such an inflexible monetary
system is clearly non-viable. In practice, from the beginning each
national state will try to get an advantage over the others. This
will create all kinds of conflicts, leading to eventual breakdown.
Neither will the attempt to impose a regime of permanent austerity
work.
“The
central problem may be simply stated: the idea that economies of such
different characters, all pulling in different directions, can be
successfully harnessed to a unified central currency, backed up by
common funds and binding legislation, is clearly false. The
capitalist system is anarchic by its very nature. The attempt to tie
these economies into a rigid common exchange rate will immediately
give rise to a whole series of distortions and unbearable
contradictions. When the economic conditions of one state demand an
increase in interest rates, those of another will demand a reduction.
Who decides? It is not difficult to foresee the answer. As the chief
economic power in Europe, Germany will impose its criteria through
the Bundesbank which will effectively control the central banks. We
already saw this when the Bundesbank increased interest rates without
bothering to consult its partners. This was the case even before EMU
has been introduced. EMU would only put the official stamp on the
actual relation of forces that already exists.
“In a
fixed exchange system, some are bound to lose out. (…) Although
they have indicated that they intend to join EMU in the first wave,
Spain and Italy are too weak to do this without causing intolerable
contradictions at home. Greece is automatically excluded, although
the Simitis government is launching an unprecedented attack against
living standards in the hope of qualifying at some date in the
distant future. Likewise the Portuguese Socialists are doing the
dirty work of the capitalists. This is preparing the ground for an
explosion of the class struggle in all these countries in the next
few years.
“(…)
The introduction of EMU will not abolish the boom-slump cycle. The
movement into recession will inevitably affect the finances of each
country somewhat differently depending on the relative strengths and
weaknesses. But it must mean a decline in income from taxes and an
increase in expenditure on such things as unemployment. What action
could the British government take in the above-mentioned case? Under
Maastricht, it would not be allowed to borrow money to cover the
deficit. The only way out would be to cut spending and raise taxes in
the middle of a recession (…)?
“(…)
On a capitalist basis, a stable monetary union cannot be achieved
without a unified state. Moreover, the crushing domination of the
world market means that, to be viable, any regional currency must fit
in with the global exchange rate system. (…) Just how they propose
to maintain a fixed exchange rate in a world market characterised by
floating exchange rates is not at all clear. Economists in the USA
are openly sceptical about the idea. Just how sound will the euro be?
If international money markets are not convinced it is worth what the
European bankers say, then it will be no more secure against
speculative currency movements than, say, the Italian lira at the
present moment.
“(…)
All the burden of a recession must be borne by each member state
unaided. The intention is to compel each government to maintain sound
finance through the good old method of raising taxes, cutting public
spending and selling off state assets.
“This
stratagem leaves out of account the fact that before the first world
war the trade unions and the workers' political parties were
relatively weak, and the working class itself was actually a minority
in most of the countries of Europe (Britain was the exception,
because it had entered the phase of capitalist development far
earlier than the others). Since the second world war the class
balance of forces in Europe has been transformed. The social reserves
of reaction, in particular the peasantry, have been whittled away by
industrial development. The working class has become the dominant
force in society, and will resist any attempt to take away the gains
it has made since 1945.
“The
attempt to go back to the classical period of capitalism will provoke
an unprecedented upsurge in the class struggle. But there is no
guarantee that it will bring the benefits that the capitalists
anticipate. By placing a heavy burden on the shoulders of even the
weakest European economies, they run the risk of provoking a
collapse. The terms of the proposed monetary union assume that each
country must stand on its own feet—to use the phrase beloved of all
bankers.
“At
present, European governments can raise money in international
finance markets to cover their debts, and (with the exception of
Greece) are regarded as safe bets. But Italy's ratio of public debt
and unfunded pension liabilities is more than twice as large as
Germany's. When Italy no longer has its own currency and central
bank, such weakness will inevitably lead to an increase in the cost
of credit. New York sometimes pays a higher risk premium than Italy,
although its ratio of debt to income is much lower.
“Even
now the major credit ratings agencies cannot agree about how to
classify the future debt issued in the new currency, which suggests
that there will be wide divergences in the credit ratings of the
European countries after 1999. The capitalists in Italy and the other
weaker economies will be forced to pay a higher rate of interest than
the others, thus cutting into the rate of profit. In the longer term,
this can destabilise the finances of such states, raising the danger
of a crisis. For the first time, international investors are talking
(in private, of course) of the risk of default in Europe.
“Just as
Quebec is regarded as a high risk and has to pay very high premiums
in order to borrow money, because of the danger of secession, so
international finance capital is already contemplating the risk of a
break-up of EMU even before it has been put in place. They calculate
that the policy of permanent cuts and austerity demanded by EMU will
provoke such social unrest that it will break down. Starting with
countries like Italy and Finland, the weaker economies will be forced
to break away. In
the event of a recession, the whole thing will tend to break up.”
(My emphasis, AW)
That
is what we wrote in 1997. At the time when we wrote this, Greece was
not yet a member of the euro-zone, and therefore we thought that the
weakest links were Italy, Spain, Portugal and Finland. But the
general thrust of the argument was absolutely correct, although it
contrasted with the general mood of optimism about the euro and
European unification that existed at that time. At the time even some
of our supporters were doubtful about this perspective. Now it is a
fact.
The
euro has slumped 9.9 percent against the dollar since November,
reflecting concern that countries including Greece will be unable to
cut their budget deficits. The common currency and stocks in the
region continued to fall as European leaders met to discuss plans to
defend Greece. But investors were not impressed, complaining that the
plan lacked details.
According
to Societe Generale SA strategist Albert Edwards, the weak capitalist
economies of Southern European are “trapped in an overvalued
currency and suffocated by low competitiveness, a situation that will
lead to the break-up of the Euro bloc”. (February 12, Bloomberg
report). The problem for countries including Portugal, Spain and
Greece “is that years of inappropriately low interest rates
resulted in overheating and rapid inflation,” Now, Edwards says,
even if governments“could slash their fiscal deficits, the lack of
competitiveness within the euro-zone needs years of relative (and
probably given the outlook elsewhere, absolute) deflation. Any
help given to Greece merely delays the inevitable break-up of the
euro-zone.”
(my emphasis, AW)
Danger
of more defaults
Edwards
was voted second-best European strategist in a 2009 Thomson Extel
survey. The report also named Societe Generale as the top economics
and strategy research firm for a third straight year. These views
therefore must be taken as the view of the serious strategists of
capital. However, it is not clear that the present crisis will lead
to a swift demise of the euro. Too much is at stake for the German
and French bourgeois, who will do everything they can to prop up the
common currency. But if the crisis deepens, the situation will
change.
This
is a very serious situation for the whole of Europe. The danger is
that, if Greece is allowed to default, it can cause a tidal wave of
defaults, affecting not just Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland, but
even Britain. It would lead to the immediate collapse of the already
feeble economic recovery in Europe and the after-shocks would be felt
all over the world. This explains the tender concern of the European
leaders.
There
has been talk of a German-led rescue scheme. But this has its own
problems. If it materialises, other European countries may be queuing
up, cap in hand, for assistance. The problem is by no means confined
to Greece, as the bond markets are well aware! The international
moneylenders are increasingly worried about the credit-worthiness of
Spain, Ireland and Portugal, and there is dark muttering about the
state of Britain’s finances. It is one thing to bail out the Greek
economy, which is relatively small. But what will happen if they have
to rescue Spain, Portugal, Ireland and even Britain?
In
order to reassure the markets that these countries are able and
willing to repay their debts, the international Shylocks are
insisting that they must increase taxes and cut spending. But such a
policy spells disaster for economies that still remain trapped in a
recession with rising unemployment. “This is madness. If we cut
state spending now, it will destroy the recovery!” But the
plaintive laments of the Keynesians have no effect on the icy hearts
of the international bankers, who are only interested in getting
their money back – with a handsome return.
Europe’s
troubles are not the only cause for concern. China, worried about
increasing inflation and asset bubbles, has begun to cut lending.
India’s central bank has raised reserve requirements and Brazil’s
stimulus packet is being phased out. The big central banks of the
rich countries are backing away from “quantitative easing”,
printing money to buy longer-dated securities, and the emergency
liquidity facilities they introduced at the height of the crisis are
now coming to an end.
Since
the main (virtually the only) motor force for the “recovery” was
state expenditure, this is causing concern among investors, who, as
we know, are motivated not by rational considerations but by the same
kind of herd instinct that causes the wildebeest on the African
savannah to stampede suddenly. There are already indications of such
a shift. Asset prices and stock markets have fallen sharply,
commodity prices have tumbled and there is increased volatility.
The
MSCI World Index of global share prices has fallen by almost 10% from
its peak on January 14th. In place of the earlier optimism about a
“V”-shaped recovery, the pages of the financial press are now
dominated by pessimism about a W-shaped double-dip recession. The
fears are growing that governments will be forced to remove monetary
and fiscal support too soon and the prospects of a recovery in 2010
will collapse in a new crisis.
America’s
GDP figures indicate an increase in output at an annualised rate of
5.7% in the fourth quarter of 2009. But these figures are misleading
because the growth was mainly due to firms rebuilding their stocks.
The US economy is still shedding jobs (although at a lower rate),
share prices are falling, and the housing market is still weak. There
is no sign of an increase in consumer spending, and with plenty of
idle capacity, firms are not likely to increase investments.
In
Europe and Japan the situation is far worse. Although Japanese
exports are recovering, the economy has slipped back into deflation.
In the euro-zone, recovery was showing signs of weakness long before
the Greek crisis. Domestic demand has stalled even Germany, where
households have no excess debt to pay off.
The
recovery is evident only in some “emerging” economies such as
India and Brazil, which have had strong growth in domestic demand and
little spare capacity. China has maintained a high rate of growth
thanks to a huge increase in government-directed lending, but for
that very reason its economy is vulnerable to a sudden reduction in
public funding. The outlook for the world economy is therefore
extremely uncertain. Thus is what lies behind the nervousness of
investors.
The
truth is that the recovery depends on state aid, loans, guarantees to
the banks and subsidies to the big manufacturers. Like a decrepit old
man on crutches, the capitalist system is propped up by government
stimulus. This is even more the case with weak capitalist economies
like Greece. The speculators are hovering round it like vultures
circulating above a wounded animal, waiting for the kill. If Greece
goes under, the investors will lose confidence in other heavily
indebted governments (Spain, Portugal, Ireland...) and this can
trigger a chain reaction that can affect even the stronger economies
and their currencies.
The
danger is that the big rich economies will repeat the mistakes made
in America in 1937 and Japan in 1997, when the government –
thinking the worst was over increased taxes and tightened monetary
policy, pushing the economy back into recession. Bourgeois economists
and politicians are always telling us that they have “learned the
lessons of history”, to which Hegel long ago replied that anybody
who studies history can only conclude that nobody has ever learned
anything from it. That is amply conformed by the study of economic
history, where the capitalists constantly repeat the mistakes of the
past.
Crisis
of the bourgeois
Revolution
always begins at the top, with crises and splits in the ruling class.
The growing divisions in the US ruling class shows that they are in a
blind alley. The clashes between Keynesians and Monetarists, between
Republicans and Democrats, are an indication of the seriousness of
the crisis. Obama tries to be all things to all men, but in reality
displays complete impotence. The constant vacillations of Obama are a
reflection of uncertainty and lack of any real perspective of the
bourgeoisie as a whole. He is a master at demagogically exuding
confidence and inspiring hope in ordinary Americans. But this
rhetoric is empty of all real content, and this emptiness has been
cruelly exposed by events.
The
splits and vacillations of the bourgeois in Europe and America are a
reflection of the depth of the crisis. They placed all their hopes on
an economic recovery. But this is like a mirage that vanishes every
time you get close to it. The central problem is not credit but
overproduction, which manifests itself as overcapacity. Output
remains far below its potential. This is the greatest condemnation of
capitalism and a clear proof that it has outlived its historical
usefulness.
The
stagnation of the productive forces and the remorseless growth of
unemployment – even at a time when the recession is supposed to be
over – tell the same story. The problem of the huge and
unsustainable deficits of Greece, Spain and Portugal is not the cause
of the problem but only a reflection of it.
The
bourgeois economists have foreseen nothing and understood nothing. On
21
October
2009, the Financial
Times
wrote: “As late as 2006, it was widely agreed the kind of disaster
that was about to unfold was simply impossible.” They reacted to a
crisis that they thought was “simply impossible” by resorting to
methods that they also considered “simply impossible”: pumping
enormous amounts of money into the financial system and therefore
creating deficits that are unprecedented in peacetime.
Now
the same bourgeois say that these deficits are dangerous, and that
governments need to do more to control them by brutal cuts in living
standards. From the standpoint of orthodox bourgeois economics this
is undeniable. But then they are left with the contradiction that in
order to achieve economic growth, any attempt to carry out such a
policy will have the opposite effect.
The
bourgeoisie finds itself trapped in an insoluble dilemma. At the
meeting of the G7’s finance ministers on February 6, they concluded
that it was too early to begin withdrawing state aid. But they were
unable to agree on a plan to prevent a fiscal catastrophe. They only
have one solution for the huge deficits caused by the bail-out of the
capitalist system: a policy of brutal cuts, austerity and
counter-reforms for a whole generation. But they have a small
problem: such a policy will meet with the resistance of the working
class. Greece shows just that.
Nowadays
workers in many countries consider it normal and an automatic right
that when they finish working at 60 or 65 they will receive some
money from the state. But under capitalism it is not normal and it is
not an automatic right. The first man to introduce pensions was
Bismarck. This reactionary Bonapartist kindly introduced pensions for
everybody over 70 years of age, at a time when in Germany the average
life expectancy was 45.
Euro-zone
governments have borrowed a record €110bn from the markets so far
this year, forcing up borrowing costs for those countries with the
weakest public finances as they pay a heavy price for their huge debt
levels. The solution of the bourgeois is to cut public spending
rather than raise taxes. Some even talk openly of abolishing the
state pension altogether, and in the long run, if they are not
defeated by a movement of the workers, this will be placed on the
order of the day. They will begin to test the ground with measures
like raising the retirement age. France is already moving in that
direction and some other countries have already tentatively moved in
the same direction.
What
next?
Capitalism
moves through booms and slumps. At a certain point the capitalist
world will inevitably enter a period of industrial recovery – in
some countries we have already seen the first signs of this. This is
an organic law of capitalist society. However, economic recovery in
no sense indicates the re-establishment of equilibrium in the class
relations in society. This is shown by the crisis of Greek
capitalism, as the Financial
Times
clearly understands:
“The
Greek turmoil reflects a wider crisis of imbalances in the 16-nation
euro-zone, and everyone will have to make a contribution to bring
this wider crisis under control. Specifically, Greece and a few other
countries - notably, Portugal and Spain - have very big current
account deficits, while Germany, Europe’s champion exporter and the
euro-zone’s largest economy, tends to run big current account
surpluses. The Greek deficit was a remarkable 12 per cent of gross
domestic product in the third quarter of 2009, and Portugal’s stood
at 10 per cent.”(Financial
Times,
February 1, 2010)
The
Greek crisis is without doubt the most dangerous crisis in the
euro-zone’s history. The EU’s highest authorities have told
Greece to slash its wage bill, speed up pension reform and set aside
10% of expenditure to pull itself out of the present critical state.
Papandreou has done a deal with opposition conservative leaders in an
effort to prevent social unrest. But the prospect of three years of
economic austerity is a finished recipe for an explosion of the class
struggle in Greece.
This
is understood by the serious strategists of capital, like Edwards,
who writes: “Unlike Japan or the U.S., Europe has an unfortunate
tendency towards civil unrest when subjected to extreme economic
pain,” Consigning the countries in southern Europe with the weakest
finances “to a prolonged period of deflation is most likely to
impose too severe a test on these nations.”
The
ruling class and the EU is exerting brutal pressure on the leadership
of the PASOK, which, using the excuse of debt and deficit, will try
to impose a harsh programme. This is provoking a huge reaction from
the working class who voted for the PASOK and are now entering into
struggle to defend their living conditions. On February 10,
public-sector workers, from teachers to rubbish-collectors, stopped
work all over Greece. Despite the persistent rain they came onto the
streets to chant slogans against a pay freeze in basic pay combined
with a slashing of allowances. A protest by Greek farmers was even
more militant. Their tractors have been blocking many Greek highways,
and the main border crossing with Bulgaria, for three weeks.
The
Socialist leaders in Greece are trying to push through a programme of
tough measures to raise taxes and curb spending. The conservative
opposition that was kicked out last October, wholeheartedly backs
these measures. Its leader, Antonis Samaras, was thanked by the
European Commission president, José Manuel Barroso, for his
“constructive attitude”. But the consensus will not last. The pay
cuts will cause much pain, and the bourgeois are now preparing for
the “reform” of the pension system, which will raise the average
retirement age in Greece from 58 to 63. Even these measures will not
be sufficient to raise “productivity and efficiency” as the
bourgeois demand.
The
Greek government has announced a sweeping overhaul of the tax system,
which includes a drive to collect more revenue from the rich. But the
rich have a thousand ways of avoiding the payment of tax –
particularly in Greece. The central problem is the depth of the
recession, which, despite all the confident predictions, has not been
overcome. The present recovery has a weak and unstable character.
The
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which includes the Bank of
England, the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, said
it feared that the problems of the world's banks are far from solved
and could easily trigger a so-called “double dip” or “W-shaped"
downturn. “A significant risk is therefore that the current
stimulus will lead only to a temporary pick-up in growth, followed by
protracted stagnation.” An L-shaped recession would be even worse
than the current situation. It would signify a period of
“stagflation”, like that experienced by Japan in the 1990s.
Scarcely
had the ink dried on a statement by European leaders supporting
Greece in its struggle to finance its debts when more bad news
emerged from the euro-zone. Figures released on Friday, February 12
showed that GDP in the 16-country currency zone rose by just 0.1% in
the three months to the end of December compared with the previous
quarter. That there was any improvement at all was largely down to
France, where a burst of consumer spending lifted the economy by
0.6%. In the region’s other big countries, GDP was either flat—as
in Germany—or falling, as in Italy and Spain.
France
is doing better, mainly because the big role the state plays in the
economy. Government spending rose by 0.7% in the fourth quarter,
after similar increases in the previous two quarters. But France
cannot continue to grow quickly. Its budget deficit was 8% of GDP
last year: France is hardly a model of fiscal rectitude and may
struggle to contain its rising public debt.
In
Spain GDP fell by 3.1% in the year to the fourth quarter, and demand
is weighed down by debts accumulated during the long housing boom.
The unemployment rate is close to 20%. Zapatero has tried to avoid
conflict with the unions, but is now subjected to the merciless
pressure of the bond-market. This means he will be forced to cuts and
counter-reforms. There is no doubt that the Spanish workers will
react in the same way as the Greek workers are doing.
The
fiscal crisis in Greece has increased the pressure on other countries
to put their public finances in order. This will have two effects: it
will reduce GDP growth across the euro-zone, and it will lead to an
intensification of the class struggle everywhere. The rapid rise in
unemployment tends to act as a brake on economic strikes temporarily,
but the accumulated discontent in society is building up slowly and
can suddenly break out. The recent general strike in Greece is an
indication of this.
The
initial impact of the recession across most of Europe was a
significant lowering of the level of strikes. Workers feared losing
their jobs and hoped they could survive until the next recovery.
However, this dampening effect does not last forever. At a certain
point, as workers become aware of the fact that keeping their heads
low is no solution, it turns into its opposite, and from fear the
workers’ mood turns to anger and a desire to fight back. This is
what we are beginning to see now in some countries of Europe. And it
is what concerns the serious strategists of capital internationally.
The
Economist
writes:
“Still,
there is a question over how long that willingness [to accept tax
increases] will endure as Greeks count the cost of recession. Banks
have squeezed lending to consumers and small firms. The number of
bounced cheques has reached record levels. In
such a climate, the mood of nervous anxiety could give way to
seething resentment.”
And the
article continues:
“[…Papandreou]
is walking a tightrope. In a country that saw Europe’s worst riots
of recent times just over a year ago, social peace is fragile. But
the biggest threats come from fringe groups, such as ultra-leftists
and disaffected youths, not from the mainstream unions or parties.”
(The
Economist,
February 12, my emphasis, AW)
These
comments are applicable to every country in Europe. Greece is special
only insofar as it is one of several weak links of European
capitalism. But in all the countries of Europe the bourgeois parties
support cutting living standards of the workers to “solve the
crisis”, and the reformist leaders, some reluctantly (Zapatero),
some enthusiastically (Brown) obediently fall into line. The workers
will not stand idly by and watch the demolition of all the conquests
of the last 50 years. We are already witnessing the beginning of a
huge movement of the working class in Greece. In the next period this
will be replicated in one country in Europe after another.
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